Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 84 | Issue 1

Article 22

Fall 10-1-2018

A New Voting Rights Act for a New Century: How
Liberalizing the Voting Rights Act’s Bailout
Provisions Can Help Pass the Voting Rights
Advancement Act of 2017
Mario Q. Fitzgerald

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Mario Q. Fitzgerald, A New Voting Rights Act for a New Century: How Liberalizing the Voting Rights Act’s Bailout Provisions Can Help Pass
the Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2017, 84 Brook. L. Rev. (2018).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol84/iss1/22

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

A New Voting Rights Act for a New
Century
HOW LIBERALIZING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S
BAILOUT PROVISIONS CAN HELP PASS THE
VOTING RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2017
INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)1 opened avenues for
Rosanell Eaton’s political voice that had previously been closed by
Jim Crow laws. In 2013, Rosanell Eaton was a ninety-two-year old
African American woman living in her hometown of Louisburg,
North Carolina.2 Despite growing up in a segregated town, Eaton
graduated as valedictorian of her class, overcame literacy test
requirements to register to vote, voted regularly in North Carolina
elections, and helped other members of her community register
and vote.3 For her civic activism, Eaton experienced racist acts such
as having small crosses burned in her front yard and even having
bullets shot at her house.4 She nevertheless remained an active
voter.5 Despite her leadership, Eaton fell under threat of losing her
vote after North Carolina passed its voting law in 2013, H.B. 589,
which reduced days for early voting, instituted voter identification
requirements, eliminated same-day registration, and restricted
out-of-precinct provisional ballots.6
Though the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit struck H.B. 589 down in 2016, the law prevented
North Carolinians, like Eaton, from voting for three years.7 H.B.

1 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
2 Complaint at 7, N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP. v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204
(4th Cir. 2016) (No. 1:13-CV-00658), ECF No. 1.
3 Id. at 7–9.
4 Id. at 8.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 8–9; see also H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), Voter
Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. SESS. LAWS 2013-381, pt. 2 (detailing Part 2 of H.B.
589 in which the law required the use of photo identification for voting in person).
7 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241–42 (4th Cir.
2016); Editorial, North Carolina’s Voting Law Goes on Trial, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015),
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589 was able to go into effect, because, earlier in 2013, the
United States Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder
invalidated the VRA’s coverage formula,8 which was used to
prevent select jurisdictions from passing voting laws without
federal oversight.9 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts argued that the VRA’s coverage formula was
unconstitutional due to (1) its use of outdated data to identify
which jurisdictions fell under the preclearance provision; and (2)
its violation of the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’
among the States.”10 Chief Justice Roberts then stated that if
Congress still intended to “divide the States” to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment, it must identify the targeted jurisdictions
based on “current conditions.”11 By nullifying the coverage
formula, the Supreme Court severely limited the VRA’s power to
challenge discriminatory voting laws.12 Congress subsequently
took on the challenge of drafting a new coverage formula to fit
such “current conditions.”13
In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling, members of
the House and Senate introduced identical bills called the Voting
Rights Advancement Act (VRAA) of 2017.14 Congress drafted the
VRAA with the purpose of updating the VRA’s coverage
formula.15 Republicans have not supported the VRAA, however,
giving the bill little to no chance of passage.16 Though the VRAA
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/opinion/north-carolinas-voting-law-goes-on-trial.html
[https://perma.cc/LG7J-JNTD].
8 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). The coverage formula of the
VRA set forth two elements to determine if a state should be put under federal
jurisdiction for approval of any new voting laws. The first element was whether the state
or a political subdivision of the state had in place “a test or device” in place on November
1, 1964. If so, the federal government moved to the second element to determine if less
than 50 percent of persons of voting age were registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or
that less than 50 percent of persons of voting age voted in the presidential election of
November 1964. If both elements were satisfied, then the state would be placed under
the rules of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act: The
Formula for Coverage Under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act#formula
[https://perma.cc/7V38-WYAV] [hereinafter DOJ Section 4].
9 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
10 Id. at 551, 554–57.
11 Id. at 553.
12 See The Cost (in Time, Money, and Burden) of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act Litigation, NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND http://www.naacpldf.org/document/cost-timemoney-and-burden-section-2-voting-rights-act-litigation [https://perma.cc/W9LN-QB85]
[hereinafter NAACP LDF].
13 Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 553.
14 H.R. 2978, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017); S. 1419, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017).
15 H.R. 2978; S., 1419.
16 Katanga Johnson, House Democrats Seek Voting Rights Act Improvements,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 22, 2017, 5:34 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/
national-news/articles/2017-06-22/house-democrats-move-to-restore-key-provisionsof-the-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/4RZB-5X7X] (reporting Representative Sewell
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updates the coverage formula, it fails to address concerns about
equal sovereignty among the states. Congress could do so by
updating the bailout provisions of the VRA.17 Congress included
the bailout provisions in the VRA to tailor the coverage formula
for jurisdictions that passed discriminatory voting laws.18 To
address the concerns of Congressional Republicans and the
Supreme Court, this note argues that Congress should amend
the bailout provisions to complement the VRAA of 2017. With a
new coverage formula and amended bailout provisions, the VRA
will not only protect the right to vote, it will also actively
encourage more Americans to register and cast their ballots,
creating more representative governments on the local, state,
and federal levels.
This note proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the need
for the VRA and its successful defense against the initial
constitutional challenge of South Carolina v. Katzenbach. Part
II describes the VRA’s subsequent uses by Congress, and the
Supreme Court’s growing suspicions of the VRA’s
constitutionality in Northwest Austin v. Holder. Part III
discusses the Shelby County decision and the avenues it left open
for Section 4(b)’s coverage formula. Part IV examines Congress’s
attempt to restore the VRA by way of the VRAA. Part V proposes
amendments to the bailout provisions of the VRA to increase the
likelihood of the VRAA’s passage.
I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

Before passage of the VRA of 1965, federal prosecutors
litigated voting rights violations, such as literacy tests and poll
taxes, on a case-by-case basis in controversies such as Guinn v.
United States and Smith v. Allwright.19 Prosecutors had little

as saying that “no Republicans were willing to support the [bill]”); H.R. 2978 (115th):
Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/115/hr2978 [https://perma.cc/M464-RFG3]; S. 1419 (115th): Voting Rights
Advancement Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s1419
[https://perma.cc/7HY4-G3QJ].
17 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)) (describing the bailout
provisions which are practices a jurisdiction must end, procedures that must be deemed
no longer necessary, such as the use of federal examiners, and measures that may be
enacted, such as making voter registration more convenient, in order to receive a
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia).
18 J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of the Voting
Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON
DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 257 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007).
19 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: Before the Voting Rights Act,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-
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success following this strategy, and black voter registration
rates remained well below the rates of white voters.20 To remedy
the problem of case-by-case litigation, Congress passed the
VRA.21 With the enactment of the VRA, Congress required the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to challenge and review
proposed voting laws in certain jurisdictions before the laws
were implemented.22
A.

The Voting Rights Act Explained

The VRA was designed to protect all eligible U.S. voters
from having their vote “denied or abridged on account of race or
color . . . in any Federal, State or local election . . . or in any
political subdivision of such State.”23 Through 52 U.S.C. § 10302
(Section 2), the Attorney General or a private citizen can
challenge electoral practices implemented with a racially
discriminatory purpose.24 Section 2 applies to all states;25 52
U.S.C. § 10303 (Section 4)26 and 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (Section 5),27
on the other hand, applied only to states and political
subdivisions falling under Section 4(b)’s coverage formula28 and
allowed the DOJ or the District Court for the District of Columbia
to challenge a proposed voting law before implementation.29
Congress brought states under the coverage formula if they had
(1) maintained a “test or device”30 restricting registration or the

voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/7LFP-VLAC]; see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 650–52 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354 (1915).
20 Id.
21 KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43626, THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 12 (2015).
22 History of Federal Voting Rights Laws: The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rightslaws [https://perma.cc/3B5P-J62W]; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
79 Stat. 437, 452 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
23 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
24 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 14; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
79 Stat. 437, 446–47 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
25 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 13.
26 Id. 52 U.S.C. § 10303.
27 Id. § 10304.
28 Id. § 10303(a)(1); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 16 (showing that Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, thirty-nine counties in North Carolina, and
select counties in Arizona and Hawaii were covered under Section 4(b)’s formula).
29 About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Coverage Under the Special
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 4, 2017) [hereinafter DOJ
Section 5], https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/
2F3B-T9WE].
30 52 U.S.C. § 10303(c) defines a “test or device” as:
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act of voting on November 1, 1964; and (2) less than 50 percent
of eligible voters were registered to vote on November 1, 1964 or
less than 50 percent of eligible voters actually voted in the
November 1964 presidential election.31 Congress mandated
states falling under Section 4(b)’s formula to meet the
preclearance requirements of Section 5 to make any changes to
their electoral process.32
Under the preclearance regime, covered jurisdictions
applied to the DOJ or the District Court for the District of
Columbia for permission to implement proposed voting laws.33
Unlike Section 2, Sections 4 and 5 shifted the burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the challenged jurisdiction.34 Covered
jurisdictions therefore submitted evidence to show that the
proposed laws did not racially discriminate against voters.35 The
DOJ and the District Court for the District of Columbia used
these provisions to protect and enforce voting rights in an
unprecedented manner after the failure of case-by-case
litigation.36 As the coverage formula risked covering an excessive
number of jurisdictions, Congress included a bailout provision
for jurisdictions that had not discriminated against voters
within a specified time frame.37
A jurisdiction could be released from the coverage
formula and the preclearance regime by obtaining a bailout;38 to
do so, a jurisdiction appealed to a three-judge panel of the
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory
judgment.39 The appealing jurisdiction had the burden of proving
that it had not racially discriminated, by purpose or effect,

any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for
voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any
matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any
particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other
class.
52 U.S.C. § 10303(c) (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
31 DOJ Section 4, supra note 8; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
79 Stat. 437, 448 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
32 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 16–17; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, 79 Stat. 437, 452 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
33 DOJ Section 5, supra note 29.
34 See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 17.
35 See DOJ Section 5, supra note 29.
36 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws: Before the Voting Rights Act,
supra note 19.
37 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 447–48 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10303(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)).
38 Hebert, supra note 18, at 259.
39 Id.
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against voters of color.40 Before a full year passed, the VRA faced
its first legal challenge which included challenges to the
coverage formula, preclearance regime, and bailout provisions.41
B.

South Carolina v. Katzenbach Presents the First Legal
Challenge to the Voting Rights Act

In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, South Carolina
attempted to enjoin the federal government’s efforts at enforcing
the VRA.42 Among its many contentions, South Carolina argued
that the coverage formula and the preclearance provisions of the
VRA were beyond Congress’s delegated powers and violated “the
principle of the equality of States.”43 Additionally, South
Carolina asserted that the responsibility of making and applying
specific remedies to Fifteenth Amendment violations should be
left entirely to the purview of the courts.44
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the federal
government had previously attempted to litigate voting rights
violations after they had occurred rather than demanding that
certain states alert the federal government of the proposed
changes before they were enacted.45 The Court also
acknowledged that some states under the coverage formula had
previously created new rules for the “sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
court decrees.”46 After noting that the preclearance regime was
an “uncommon exercise of congressional power,”47 the Court
reasoned that “exceptional conditions can justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate.”48 After validating the
coverage formula and preclearance provisions, the Court ruled
on the VRA’s bailout provisions.
The Supreme Court examined the bailout provisions of the
VRA,49 which, at the time, could be used after five years of not
enacting any discriminatory voting laws or policies.50 Against the
Id. at 259–60.
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307; see also Hebert, supra note 18, at 259.
42 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307.
43 Id. at 323.
44 See id. at 327.
45 Id. at 328.
46 Id. at 335.
47 Id. at 334.
48 Id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Wilson
v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917)).
49 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
50 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 331. Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in
1970 and required states to be free of VRA violations for ten years before gaining
eligibility to use the bailout provisions. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-285, sec. 3, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970).
40
41
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contention that the provisions placed “an impossible burden of
proof upon States,” the Court opined that the burden of
submitting affidavits to (1) prove that a state had not
discriminated against racial minorities for five years; and (2)
rebut any evidence to the contrary offered by the federal
government was a “quite bearable” burden of proof, because
states and political subdivisions had specific knowledge about
facts concerning the conduct of voting officials.51 The Court
therefore upheld the VRA even though the preclearance measure
presented an unprecedented level of federal involvement in
affairs delegated to states.52 The VRA thus properly enforces the
Fifteenth Amendment53 and makes racial discrimination in voting
unconstitutional.54 Indeed, the VRA, throughout its history,
successfully prevented discrimination in voting.55
II.

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN ACTION

A.

Immediate Effects of the Voting Rights Act

After being signed into law, the VRA took immediate
effect by sending federal examiners into jurisdictions to register
black voters.56 Black voters in southern states began seeing
sharp increases in their registration rates.57 Black voters were
then able to translate their increased registration rates into
increased political representation.58 Furthermore, black
southerners were able to leverage their political power to gain
Id. at 332.
Id. at 337.
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
54 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337.
55 See COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12.
56 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2012 & Supp. II 2015); Introduction to Federal Voting
Rights Laws, The Effect of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.
justice.gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws-0 [https://perma.cc/EZ62-XTG2].
57 Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, The Effect of the Voting Rights
Act, supra note 56. Almost one million black Americans registered to vote within four
years of the Voting Rights Act’s passage. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12. Mississippi
went from having only 5% of its black voting population registered to vote in 1956 to
32.9% in 1966. Id. at 13. After just two more years, nearly 60% of black Mississippi voters
were registered. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 212 (rev. ed. 2009); WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE
159 (2016). By 1998, 71% of black Mississippi voters were registered to vote. WALDMAN,
supra note 57, at 159. In Alabama, the black voting population registered to vote at a
rate of 11% in 1956 and increased its voter registration rate to 57% in 1968. COLEMAN,
supra note 21, at 13; KEYSSAR, supra note 57, at 212. The black voting age population in
North Carolina experienced an increase in registration rates going from 24% in 1956 to
51% in 1966. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 13. Most dramatically, black voters in
Tennessee saw their registration rate increase from 27% in 1956 to 71.7% in 1966. Id.
58 “[T]he number of black elected officials in the South [increased] from [seventytwo] to 159, after the 1966 elections.” COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12.
51
52
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economic opportunities.59 Minority voters, as a whole, also
witnessed increased legal protections stemming from the
preclearance regime.60
The VRA brought new jurisdictions under its preclearance
coverage through its Section 4(b) formula.61 Texas, Arizona, and
Alaska were covered in their entirety in 1975.62 The VRA brought
smaller jurisdictions such as two townships in Michigan and
counties in South Dakota, California, New York, Florida, and
North Carolina under the preclearance regime by 1976 as well.63
Regarding voting laws actually challenged and blocked under
Section 5, the DOJ received over one thousand submissions of
challenged laws with each submission possibly containing
multiple allegedly discriminatory laws.64 The DOJ ultimately
issued over three thousand objections.65 States and their political
subdivisions took notice of these enforcement actions and
adjusted their electoral practices accordingly.66 Between 2000 and
2012, the DOJ received over two hundred thousand submissions
yet issued only seventy-six objections.67 Five years after the VRA
was passed, covered jurisdictions, believing they had ceased using
discriminatory tests and devices, applied for a bailout.68
Jurisdictions applied for declaratory judgments to release
them from the preclearance regime in 1970 and continued to do so
59 Black southerners experienced an increase in public and private sector
employment as well as an “increase in . . . state transfer payments.” See James C. Cobb,
The Voting Rights Act at 50: How It Changed the World, TIME (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://time.com/3985479/voting-rights-act-1965-results/ [https://perma.cc/5ZW2-XV6K].
60 COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 12 (showing that the DOJ reviewed “[over] half
a million voting changes submitted under Section 5”).
61 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
62 Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug.
6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://
perma.cc/CLS5-C9UP]. The Voting Rights Act also began protecting language minorities
in 1975 by demanding that jurisdictions with large enough “limited English proficiency”
populations produce “bilingual ballots, translated voting materials, and oral language
assistance.” Glenn D. Magpantay, Sound Barriers Ver. 2.0: The Second Generation of
Enforcement of the Language Assistance Provisions (Section 203) of the Voting Rights
Act, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (2014); see also Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 203, § 4, 89 Stat. 400, 401–02 (1975).
63 Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra note 62.
64 According to data compiled by the Justice Department, approximately 1,102
submissions were filed, the vast majority of which related to issues of vote dilution. Mark
A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department’s Implementation of Section 5
of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, As Intended by Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 79, 102–04 (2006).
65 Id at 102. According to the Justice Department, approximately 3,126
objections were made. Id.
66 Id. at 103.
67 Rick Pildes & Dan Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The
Gap Between Perception and Reality, ELECTION L. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:39 AM), https://
electionlawblog.org/?p=54521 [https://perma.cc/HMX3-KNXZ].
68 Hebert, supra note 18, at 259–60.
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through 1984.69 By 1970, Alaska and counties in Arizona, Idaho,
and North Carolina had obtained bailouts in the initial round of
applications.70 By 1975, New York had obtained approval to be
bailed out of the preclearance regime.71 Alaska obtained a bailout
once again after some of its counties were covered after 1970.72 By
1982, jurisdictions in Maine, Oklahoma, and New Mexico had
obtained bailouts.73 Members of Congress who approved extensions
of the VRA’s preclearance regime looked favorably upon such
bailouts as evidence that jurisdictions would not be perpetually
punished once they began complying with federal voting laws.74
Since the initial passage of the VRA, Congress has
amended and extended the law several times.75 Through these
amendments, Congress also made changes to the bailout
provisions.76 By adding the bailout provisions to the original VRA,
69
70

Id. at 260–61.
Id. at 260. Gaston and Nash counties in North Carolina failed to obtain

bailouts. Id.
71 Id. The Voting Rights Act, however, covered counties in New York again in
1974. Id. Virginia also failed to satisfy the bailout provisions. Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 261.
74 See Timothy G. O’Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New
Bailout Provision and Virginia, 69 VA. L. REV. 765, 766–67 (1983).
75 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1970, 1975, 1982, 1992, and
2006. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 19. The Katzenbach Court noted that the use of Section
5 was “an uncommon exercise of congressional power” addressing “exceptional
conditions.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966). Congress, therefore,
set time limits on the VRA and extended its application only after reviewing voting
conditions. Robert A. Kengle & Marcia Johnson-Blanco, What Is Next for Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act?, 39 AM. BAR. ASS’N: HUM. RTS. MAG. (Oct. 23, 2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2012_vol_39
_/winter_2012_-_vote/what_is_next_forsection5ofthevotingrightsact/ [https://perma.cc/
M3WE-3FSB]. The 1970 amendments extended the prohibitions on literacy tests, ended
durational residency requirements for presidential elections, extended Section 5’s
preclearance coverage to jurisdictions in northern and western states such as New York,
California, and Alaska, lowered the voting age to eighteen, and more. Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 314–19 (1970); COLEMAN, supra
note 21, at 19–20. In the 1975 amendments, Congress extended the Voting Rights Act
for seven more years. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat.
400 (1975); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 20. Congress also permanently banned the use
of literacy tests, expanded Section 5 and Section 8’s protections to language minorities,
and permitted individuals to (1) bring a suit against a jurisdiction to bring it within
preclearance coverage and (2) request the use of federal examiners in a jurisdiction,
along with other policies. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 20–21. In the 1982 and 1992
amendments, Congress extended the requirements and protections for bilingual
elections. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(1982); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921, 921–
22 (1992); COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 21–22. In the 1982 amendments specifically,
Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to allow plaintiffs to establish a
violation by showing that a voting law discriminatorily impacted racial or language
minorities regardless of the legislator’s intent. COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 22.
76 Congress amended the Voting Rights Act’s bailout provisions in 1970, 1975,
and 1982. Hebert, supra note 18, at 260–61. The bailout provision of the Voting Rights
Act allows a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 to apply for a declaratory judgment from

232

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

Congress reasoned that the coverage formula of Section 4(b)
would be imprecise and that unfairly covered jurisdictions would
need a vehicle to exit the preclearance regime.77 The bailout
provision also survived judicial scrutiny from the Supreme Court
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.78 When representatives from
Virginia attempted to weaken the bailout provisions during the
1975 debates to amend the provisions, other members of the
House rejected the proposed amendments.79 Representative
Abner Mikva specifically argued that the amendments should be
rejected on the ground that they attempted to weaken the VRA
by removing preclearance coverage.80 Subsequently, Congress
passed the bailout provisions with even more stringent
requirements, declaring that a state had to show that it had not
used a discriminatory “test or device” in seventeen years.81
Though the bailout provision and the VRA as a whole continued
to garner approval from Congress, jurisdictions under Section 5
coverage still challenged the law’s legality when denied an
opportunity to bailout of coverage.82
B.

City of Rome v. United States Clarifies Which
Jurisdictions Are Eligible for the Bailout Provisions

The U.S. Attorney General brought Georgia under the
VRA’s preclearance regime in 1965, bringing the city of Rome,
the District Court for the District of Columbia if it can show that during ten consecutive
years before petitioning for declaratory judgment it has (A) not used a racially
discriminatory test or device denying or abridging the right to vote; (B) not received a
final judgment from a United States court that it used a racially discriminatory test or
device to deny or abridge the right to vote; (C) not been assigned any federal examiners
or observers; (D) brought all governmental units within its jurisdiction into compliance
with the Voting Rights Act; (E) repealed any changes that the Attorney General
successfully objected to or to which the District Court for the District of Columbia denied
a declaratory judgment; and (F) eliminated voting measures which “inhibit or dilute”
access to the ballot and engaged in efforts to expand opportunities for registration and
voting. Even after receiving a declaratory judgment, the jurisdiction remains under the
District Court for the District of Columbia’s jurisdiction for ten years, and if any
subsequent violations occur, the jurisdiction will be placed on the preclearance regime
again. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1)(A)–(F) (2012 & Supp. II 2015). If no violations occur within
those ten years, however, the court will release the jurisdiction from both the court’s
jurisdiction and the preclearance regime. Id. § 10303(a)(5). The bailout provisions
originally required states to prove non-discriminatory behavior for five years, but
Congress extended the amount of time to ten years during the 1970 amendments. Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-284, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970); Hebert,
supra note 18, at 262.
77 O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 773.
78 Id. at 773–74 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324, 332 (1966)).
79 See id. at 779–81.
80 121 CONG. REC. 16,767–68 (1975) (statement of Rep. Mikva).
81 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 101, § 4(a),
89 Stat. 400, 400 (1975); Hebert, supra note 18, at 260.
82 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 162 (1980).
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Georgia under Section 5 coverage as well.83 Rome attempted to
make several changes to its electoral system in 1966 following
electoral changes made that same year by the state of Georgia.84
In addition to its electoral changes, Rome annexed surrounding
land sixty times between November 1, 1964 and February 10,
1975.85 Under the VRA, annexations “constitute[d] a change in a
‘standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.’”86
Therefore, Rome was required to report each annexation to the
Department of Justice for approval.87 After Rome sought to gain
preclearance for an annexation in 1974, “[t]he Attorney General
discovered that [additional] annexations had occurred” and
requested additional information.88 After reviewing the
annexations and the 1966 electoral changes, the Attorney
General denied preclearance to Rome’s electoral changes as well
as thirteen of the city’s sixty annexations.89 Rome then filed an
action in court “based on a variety of claims.”90 Among the claims
to reach the Supreme Court, Rome argued that it should be bailed
out of Section 5 coverage as a city in compliance with the VRA.91
The Court, contrary to Rome’s pleadings, ruled that cities as
“political units of a covered jurisdiction” could not independently
apply for a bailout.92
Rome asserted that under the ruling of United States v.
Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala. it qualified as either a
“political subdivision” or a “State” for Section 4(a) bailout purposes,
but the Supreme Court disagreed.93 Instead, the Court agreed with
the district court below in ruling that Section 4(a)’s bailout
83 Id. at 160–61 (citing 30 Fed. Reg. 9,897 (Aug. 7, 1965); United States v. Bd.
of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978)).
84 Id. at 160–61.
85 Id. at 161.
86 Id. (quoting Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 381 (1971)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 162.
91 Id. The City of Rome also argued before the Court that: (1) the VRA only
vitiated voting laws that had a discriminatory intent rather than solely a discriminatory
effect, id. at 172; (2) that, the VRA was unconstitutional if it did, indeed, invalidate
voting laws that were discriminatory only in effect, id. at 173; (3) that the VRA “violate[d]
principles of federalism.” Id. at 178; and (4) that the VRA’s preclearance requirement
had outlasted its usefulness by 1975. Id. at 180. The Court, however, held that (1) based
on Congressional intent, the VRA did vitiate voting laws that had a discriminatory effect
without discriminatory intent, id. at 172; (2) that § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
empowered Congress to pass a law invalidating voting laws with only a discriminatory
effect, id. at 173; (3) that “appropriate legislation” passed to enforce the Civil War
Amendments overrode principles of federalism, id. at 179; and (4) that Congress had
made a “considered determination” to extend the preclearance regime from 1975 to 1982.
Id. at 172–73, 179, 182.
92 Id. at 167.
93 Id. at 168.
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provision applied only to states and political subdivisions covered
within an uncovered state rather than to political subdivisions
within a covered state.94 Furthermore, the Court opined that under
Section 4(a), a municipality did not fall under the definition of a
“political subdivision” or a “State.”95 Therefore, the VRA survived
the legal challenge asserted by Rome, which subsequently denied
the city its ability to use the bailout provision.96 Afterwards,
Congress made additional changes to the bailout provision.97
“Congress enacted two major revisions to the bailout
provisions” in 1982.98 Political subdivisions were allowed to bail
out separately from their states through the first revision.99 The
bailout provision was also revised to “recognize and reward”
jurisdictions complying with the law as opposed to simply
“requir[ing] them to await an expiration date which is fixed
regardless of the actual record.”100 Speaking as a co-sponsor of
the then bill of amendments, Senator William V. Roth, Jr. stated
that “the principle [the bill] embrace[d]” was “that every citizen
has the right to cast an effective vote and is entitled to all the
protections that are necessary to insure this right.”101 Senator
Roth later stated that, “S. 1992 incorporates bipartisan
compromises that reflect input from many of varied ideologies.
These compromises represent the consensus that there was a
need for an incentive and reward for those jurisdictions that were
diligent in their abidance to the act.”102 After the 1982 revisions,
twelve jurisdictions, all of which were in Virginia, bailed out of
Section 5 coverage.103 Following the 1982 revisions104 to the
bailout provision and the 2006 extension of the VRA,105 the VRA
received its most difficult challenge in 2009.106

Id. at 167–69.
Id. at 168.
96 Id. 169.
97 Hebert, supra note 18, at 262–63 (explaining how the 1982 amendments
allowed political subdivisions such as cities to bailout of Section 4(b) coverage even if the
state remained covered and allowed jurisdictions to apply for a bailout if they believed they
had a ten-year record of non-discrimination rather than wait for a set deadline to pass).
98 Id. at 262.
99 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131,
131–34 (1982); Hebert, supra note 18, at 262.
100 Hebert, supra note 18, at 262.
101 128 CONG. REC. 14,310 (1982) (statement of Sen. Roth).
102 Id.
103 Hebert, supra note 18, at 266.
104 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
105 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
106 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 193 (2009).
94
95
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The Supreme Court Gives a Warning Shot on the Voting
Rights Act’s Constitutionality in Northwest Austin

“Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One
(NAMUDNO) was created in 1987 . . . [from] a portion of Travis
County, Texas” to provide city services to its residents.107 Though it
was “responsible for its own elections,” it did not register voters nor
run the elections.108 Section 5 covered NAMUDNO as if the district
was a municipality of Texas, a covered state, though the
municipality itself had no record of racial discrimination in its
electoral practices.109 In Northwest Austin v. Holder, NAMUDNO
filed for a bailout but argued that if it failed to meet the bailout
requirements, then Section 5 of the VRA was unconstitutional.110
The District Court interpreted the term “political subdivision” to
“include[ ] only ‘counties, parishes, and voter-registering
subunits.’”111 A political subdivision like NAMUDNO that did not
register its voters, by definition, could not be bailed out as a
“political subdivision.”112 The Supreme Court, however, began to
express skepticism for the continued need of Section 5 because of
its “federalism costs.”113
The Court noted that voter registration rates and voter
turnout rates between white and black Americans were reaching
parity, distinguishing the conditions of NAMUDNO’s claim from
the conditions of previous voting rights claims in which the VRA
remained unaltered.114 Though the VRA deserved credit for the
improved circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that,
“[p]ast success alone, however, is not adequate justification to
retain the preclearance requirements.”115 The Chief Justice
continued by expressing concern over the VRA’s continued
violation of the “equal sovereignty” of the states after the
improvements in voter turnout and registration rates.116 He
further conveyed apprehension over the fact that disparities in
voter turnout and registration were becoming wider in uncovered
Id. at 200.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 200–01.
111 Id. at 201. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F.
Supp. 2d 221, 232 (2008)).
112 Id. at 197.
113 Id. at 202. Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern at the continuing
broad powers of the VRA, stating, “Section 5 goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth
Amendment by suspending all changes to state election law—however innocuous—until
they have been precleared by the federal authorities in Washington, D.C.” Id.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 203.
107
108
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jurisdictions than they were in covered jurisdictions.117 Moreover,
the Court noted that there was not a settled answer regarding
which standard to apply to determine if Section 5 of the VRA
remained constitutional.118 Despite these concerns, the Court
withheld judgment on the constitutionality of the VRA as the
Chief Justice wrote that doing so is “the gravest and most delicate
duty that this Court is called on to perform.”119 Instead of ruling
on the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court limited its review
to the bailout provision.120 With such a ruling, the Court allowed
the preclearance regime to remain in play but also signaled to
Congress its need to revise preclearance requirements and the
coverage formula.121
Addressing the bailout provisions, the Chief Justice took
aim at the statutory meaning of “political subdivision,” noting
how “the statutory definition . . . [did] not apply to every use of
the term” in the VRA.122 Building on its statutory interpretation,
the Court considered Congress’s 1982 amendments to the bailout
provision noting that the amendments “embraced piecemeal
bailout” and permitted political subdivisions within a covered
state to independently apply for bailout.123 The Court concluded
its analysis by reading the bailout and preclearance provisions of
Section 5 as being “governed by a principle of symmetry.”124 The
Court then ruled that all political units were to be treated as
political subdivisions for preclearance purposes, and they would
also be treated as such for bailout purposes.125 Thus, the Supreme
Court held, in contrast to Rome v. United States,126 that all
political subdivisions, including municipalities, were eligible to
independently file a bailout suit.127
The Supreme Court served a “warning to Congress” through
its ruling in Northwest Austin.128 Consequently, the Court
immediately expanded the scope of the bailout provision, allowing

Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 204.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 205–06.
121 See Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket
Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1996 (2010).
122 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 206–07.
123 Id. at 209–10.
124 Id. at 210.
125 Id.
126 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1980) (denying cities
such as Rome the ability to identify as a “political subdivision” and apply for a bailout).
127 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211.
128 Crum, supra note 121, at 1995–96.
117
118
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more covered jurisdictions to apply for a bailout.129 More
significantly, the Court called into question Section 5’s
constitutionality.130 Specifically, the Court found that Section 5
violated principles of federalism131 and required an adjusted
coverage formula.132 After the Court’s ruling, scholars and
practitioners debated whether the bailout provision was, indeed,
effective and could save Section 5 from being ruled unconstitutional.133
Presenting skepticism towards the use of the bailout
provision, Hans von Spakovsky of the Heritage Foundation
argued that the bailout provision was not sufficient to make
Section 5 constitutional, because Section 5 coverage failed to
adapt to more contemporary voting conditions.134 The practices
that Section 5 was originally created to stop were now, von
Spakovsky argued, “fad[ing] into history,” causing Section 4(b)’s
coverage formula to become an arbitrary measure of which states
were violating the right to vote based on race.135 According to von
Spakovsky, the coverage formula was, from its outset, an
imprecise measure of racially discriminatory behavior since it
used proxies such as voter registration rates and voter turnout
rates, but, as registration and turnout rates gained parity, the
formula’s imprecision grew into arbitrariness.136 Congress could
then only be understood to have passed the VRA due to political
pressures.137 Though von Spakovsky correctly noted that black
and white voter registration and turnout rates were reaching
parity, Congress’s findings that “second generation” voting
129 Jason J. Kelley, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is No Longer
Tailored to Remedy Current Patterns of Voting Discrimination: The State of Section 5
After Northwest Austin Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 67, 82 (2010).
130 Randall T. Adams, Recent Development, Northwest Austin Utility District
Number One v. Holder, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 135, 146 (2010); Crum, supra note
121, at 1995–96 (2010); Kelley, supra note 129, at 82.
131 Adams, supra note 130, at 144.
132 Kelley, supra note 129, at 82.
133 CLC Staff, New Hampshire Becomes First State to Bailout from Voting
Rights Act Preclearance Requirements, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Mar. 3, 2013),
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/news/press-releases/new-hampshire-becomes-firststate-bailout-voting-rights-act-preclearance [https://perma.cc/82KD-WGZH]; Hans von
Spakovsky, The Bailout Bait and Switch: DOJ’s Last Ditch Attempt to Rescue Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/
report/the-bailout-bait-and-switch-dojs-last-ditch-attempt-rescue-section-5-the-votingrights-act [https://perma.cc/CR4N-Y33M].
134 von Spakovsky, supra note 133. Similar to Chief Justice Roberts, von
Spakovsky was concerned that Section 5 of the VRA did not use more recent data regarding
voter registration and voter turnout rates to determine if states needed to remain under
federal oversight. See id. (“Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently observed, ‘the
registration gap between white and black voters is in single digits in the covered States;
in some of those States, blacks now register and vote at higher rates than whites.’”).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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barriers justified extending the coverage formula and
preclearance requirements would seem to belie the claim that
Congress only extended the VRA because of political pressures.138
Von Spakovsky also argued that bailouts were rarely
used and rarely granted because of the provision’s “demanding”
standards, the “political risks” of attempting to secure a bailout,
such as being labeled as racist by opposing civil rights
organizations, and the “hostility” of the DOJ’s Voting Section
within its Civil Rights Division.139 With the bailout provisions,
the DOJ and civil rights activists would be able to force covered
jurisdictions to “acced[e] to their political demands” which are
outside the scope of the VRA.140 Yet, when lawyers or scholars
asked jurisdictions why they had not applied for a bailout or did
not apply earlier, jurisdictions named lack of knowledge about
the bailout provisions and “belie[f that] the bailout process was
too complicated, time consuming, or costly” as the reasons rather
than fear of being labeled as racist.141 When jurisdictions applied
for bailout provisions, they found such worries to be
unfounded.142 Though von Spakovsky asserted that the bailout
provisions were difficult to achieve, in contrast, J. Gerald
Hebert, Senior Director of Voting Rights and Redistricting at
The Campaign Legal Center,143 argued that, in practice,
jurisdictions did not actually face such difficulties in their
bailout applications.144
The Campaign Legal Center viewed the bailout provision to
be a measure demonstrating the appropriateness of Section 5’s
preclearance coverage.145 The Campaign Legal Center hailed New
Hampshire as a model of a successful bailout of Section 5
coverage.146 J. Gerald Hebert, who represented New Hampshire,
remarked that the successful bailout demonstrated how “the
coverage formula self-tailors” and “adjusts to current needs” and
that the bailout provisions were, indeed, workable.147 Hebert had,
138 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b), 120 Stat. 577,
577 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691–92 (2006) (listing “practices such as felon
disenfranchisement, voting machines, and voter [identification] laws” as “second
generation” voting barriers).
139 von Spakovsky, supra note 133.
140 Id.
141 Hebert, supra note 18, at 271.
142 Id. at 271–72.
143 J. Gerald Hebert, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., https://campaignlegal.org/staff/jgerald-hebert [https://perma.cc/3RG8-BU9U]
144 Hebert, supra note 18, at 270.
145 CLC Staff, supra note 133.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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himself, argued in favor of the bailout provisions prior to the
Northwest Austin ruling.148 He argued that the bailout provisions
and coverage formula worked together to allow jurisdictions to
publicly prove that their elections were no longer discriminatory.149
After a jurisdiction was bailed out, Hebert claimed the bailout
provisions and coverage formula limited the costs of voting rights
litigation and eased the ability of jurisdictions to change their
electoral laws.150 Despite the decision in Northwest Austin and the
subsequent debates, Congress, much to the chagrin of the Supreme
Court, made no changes to the VRA.151 The next major challenge to
the VRA came in 2013 from Shelby County, Alabama.152
III.

THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN THE COVERAGE
FORMULA IN SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER

A.

The Coverage Formula is Ruled Unconstitutional

Shelby County, Alabama sued the DOJ after the
department challenged and blocked a referendum election that
had not been precleared.153 The county argued that Section 4(b),
which defined the coverage formula, and Section 5 of the VRA
were unconstitutional and merited a permanent injunction
against their enforcement.154 The District Court ruled against
Shelby County, noting that Congress used sufficient evidence to
justify reauthorizing Sections 4(b) and 5.155 Shelby County
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, which also ruled against the county.156 The
court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that litigation under Section 2 of the VRA was “inadequate . . . to
protect the rights of minority voters” in jurisdictions covered by
Section 5.157 The court also opined that Section 4 worked in
tandem with Section 5 “to single out the jurisdictions in which
Hebert, supra note 18, at 271.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 548–50 (2013) (remarking upon
Congress’ broadening of Sections 4 and 5 in 2006 though the electoral conditions in the
covered districts showed increased compliance with the VRA. The Court specifically
noted the election of African-American mayors in Philadelphia, MS and Selma, AL
almost fifty years after both cities experienced infamous incidents of racist violence by
individuals seeking to prevent black Americans from voting).
152 Id. at 535–36.
153 Complaint at 1, 14–15, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96),
ECF No. 1.
154 Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 540–41.
155 Id. at 541.
156 Id.
157 Id.
148
149
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discrimination is concentrated,” allowing Section 4 to be judged
as constitutional as well.158 The Supreme Court, however, did not
believe Section 4(b)’s formula to be justified any longer, nor did
it believe the bailout provisions to be a sufficient safety valve in
case the formula was overinclusive.159
Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Roberts returned to Northwest Austin’s reasoning
concerning the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’
among the States.”160 Though previous Supreme Court cases
since the South Carolina v. Katzenbach decision found the
problem of racial discrimination in voting constituted a
legitimate reason to treat states differently, the Chief Justice in
Shelby County found that “[n]early 50 years later, things have
changed dramatically.”161 The Court once again noted the parity
in voter registration and turnout rates between black and white
Americans, the increase in minority representatives, and the
length of time that racially discriminatory “tests and devices”
had been outlawed.162 Armed with this data, the Court took aim
at Section 4 to determine whether it remained “constitutional in
light of current conditions.”163
Chief Justice Roberts, unlike in Northwest Austin, was not
persuaded that the coverage formula and preclearance
requirements were justified, for the coverage formula used
outdated information to select the covered states.164 The Court
also took issue with the fact that though Congress used a wealth
of evidence to make its decision to extend the VRA, it left the
coverage formula unchanged rather than updating it.165 In its
final analysis of Section 4, the Court concluded, “Congress could
have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do
so.166 Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare
Id. (quoting Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 556–57.
160 Id. at 544 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009)).
161 Id. at 547.
162 Id. at 547–48.
163 Id. at 550.
164 Compare id. at 551 (stating that though the coverage formula was valid in
1965, it was no longer valid in the then present time), with Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204–
06 (raising the concern that the coverage formula “raise[d] serious constitutional
questions” but ultimately only addressed the statutory claim).
165 Id. at 554.
166 Congress, when making the 2006 amendments, wrote,
158
159

[V]estiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by
second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully
participating in the electoral process. The continued evidence of racially
polarized voting in each of the jurisdictions covered by the expiring provisions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 demonstrates that racial and language
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§ 4(b) unconstitutional.”167 Though the Court made no ruling on
the bailout provision, by rendering the coverage formula
inoperable, the Court essentially nullified the bailout provision.168
The Shelby County decision spurred immediate debate focusing on
which sections of the VRA could make up for the loss of
preclearance coverage.169
Bruce E. Cain, a professor of political science,170 identified
the VRA’s vulnerability to a decision such as Shelby County as
stemming from the coverage formula’s imprecision in a system
centered around states rather than a national system.171 While
the VRA worked well to combat first-generation voting
discrimination such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and redistricting,
especially when the focus was solely on disparities between black
and white voters, the act was ill-equipped to combat more recent
tools of voter discrimination. As old tools fell by the wayside, states
implemented techniques such as “voter caging, harsh voter
[identification] laws, [and] registration restrictions”;172 moreover,
minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting the continued protection
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(2)–(3), 120
Stat. 577, 577. Congress listed the number of objections filed to the DOJ, the number of
enforcement actions filed by the DOJ, the number of declaratory judgments denied by
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the number of Section 2 cases filed
against covered jurisdictions, and the continued litigation by the DOJ on behalf of
language minorities since 1982 as evidence for the continued need of the coverage
formula as defined by the VRA of 1965. Id. § 2(b)(4), 120 Stat. at 577–78.
167 Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 557.
168 Ryan J. Reilly, The Last Voting Rights Act Bailout Ever Went to Hanover
County, VA., HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2013, 7:00 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/06/25/voting-rights-bailout_n_3498927.html [https://perma.cc/9T4J-86GM].
169 Bruce E. Cain, Moving Past Section 5: More Fingers or a New Dike?, 12
ELECTION L.J. 338, 338 (2013); Edward B. Foley, If Congress Won’t Act, the Nonprofit
Community Can, 12 ELECTION L.J. 343, 343 (2013); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The
Future of the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (Oct. 23, 2013, 4:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/section_2_of_the_voting_rights_act_is
_more_effective_than_expected_new_research.html [https://perma.cc/H866-D7NF].
170 Cain, supra note 169, at 340.
171 Id. at 338.
172 Id. at 339; The Brennan Center for Justice provides the following definition
for voter caging:
Voter caging is the practice of sending mail to addresses on the voter rolls,
compiling a list of the mail that is returned undelivered, and using that list to
purge or challenge voters’ registrations on the grounds that the voters on the
list do not legally reside at their registered addresses.
Justin Levitt & Andrew Allison, A Guide to Voter Caging, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June
29, 2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/guide-voter-caging [https://perma.cc/
J97R-CL5Z]. States with harsher voter identification laws include Arizona, Georgia,
Indiana, and Ohio. Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements—Voter ID Laws,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 31, 2018) http://www.ncsl.org/research/electionsand-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/4PFQ-EKTF]. As of May 2017, twenty-
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“new minorit[y]” voters, such as Asian American and Latinx
American173 voters, increased the country’s ethnic diversity.174 Cain
argued that standardizing voting processes on a national level was
“[t]he best long-term solution” but was unlikely to be put into place
in the near future.175 Increased use of Section 3 and Section 2
litigation were, then, the best solutions in the short-term. Some
scholars, such as Edward B. Foley, proposed purely private
solutions.176 On the ground, however, the Justice Department
decided to pursue the strategy of increasing Section 2 litigation.177
B.

States and the DOJ Respond to the Shelby County
Ruling

After Shelby County, several states previously covered
under Section 5, such as Texas and North Carolina, passed
restrictive voter ID laws such as H.B. 589.178 The DOJ responded
by bringing Section 2 lawsuits.179 Though Section 2 litigation was
two states had introduced thirty-three bills to restrict voter registration since the year
2010. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-lawsroundup-2017 (May 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VW6V-ZBY5]. A specific example of a
restrictive voter registration system is Georgia’s “exact-match” system in which a
Georgia resident’s voter status is suspended if the information on their voter registration
form is not exactly the same as the information on their driver’s license and social
security records. Brentin Mock, How Dismantling the Voting Rights Act Helped Georgia
Discriminate Again, CITYLAB (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/10/
how-dismantling-voting-rights-act-helped-georgia-discriminate-again/572899/ [https://
perma.cc/BMB5-XDXL]. Several civil rights organizations have challenged Georgia’s
“exact-match” program through the case Georgia Coalition for the People’s Agenda v.
Kemp. CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., https://campaignlegal.org/cases-actions/georgia-coalitionpeoples-agenda-v-kemp [https://perma.cc/QT9M-Z4TL].
173 I use “Latinx” as a gender non-specific term “for people of Latin American
descent.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/wordhistory-latinx [https://perma.cc/3U6P-GESL].
174 Cain, supra note 169, at 340.
175 Id.
176 Edward B. Foley proposed that the non-profit community create “a
bipartisan, blue-ribbon Voting Rights Advisory Board [(VRAB)].” Foley, supra note 169,
at 343. Though it would not have legal authority, if staffed by reputable researchers and
investigators, the VRAB could label proposed voting laws as “retrogressive” which could
influence a court’s ruling in Section 2 and Section 3 litigation. Id. at 343–44. Through
posting the progress of its investigations on its website, the VRAB would also be able to
serve as a source of transparency for proposed voting laws nationwide. Id. at 343–44.
177 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 169.
178 See, e.g., Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. SESS. LAWS 2013381; Jasmine C. Lee, How States Moved Toward Stricter Voter ID Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/03/us/elections/how-statesmoved-toward-stricter-voter-id-laws.html [https://perma.cc/Q9EA-RM7W]. (explaining
that while in 2012 only four states required photo identification to vote, by 2016 seven
states required a photo ID, and thirty-two states required a form of identification though
not necessarily with a photograph). Previously covered states such as Georgia,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia also passed strict voter ID laws, and previously
covered states such as Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina also reduced early voting
days and hours. The Fourth Circuit, however, struck down North Carolina’s law. Id.
179 Stephanopoulos, supra note 169.
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not as effective at stopping discriminatory voting laws from
being enacted, it was more successful than expected.180 Yet,
despite the unexpected victories of Section 2 litigation, a need
for a stronger voting law remained.
In the year following Shelby County, the Brennan Center
for Justice found that (1) Section 5 no longer prevented
discriminatory voting changes before they even came into effect;
(2) “challenging discriminatory laws” became increasingly
“difficult, expensive, and time-consuming;” and (3) transparency
was lost to the public as jurisdictions no longer had to disclose
information about proposed laws under Section 5.181 Without the
preclearance regime in effect, states previously covered under
Section 5 began passing laws that had already been blocked or
would likely have been blocked.
Starting after the Shelby County decision and going
through to the 2014 midterms, “fifteen states passed or
implemented” restrictive voting laws “rang[ing] from strict photo
ID requirements to early voting cutbacks to registration
restrictions.”182 Texas, in particular, was able to pass a law that had
previously been blocked by Section 5.183 While the laws in states
like Texas184 and North Carolina185 were challenged soon after they
were implemented, the cases continued through 2018 and 2017,
respectively.186 These cases demonstrated the challenges that
Section 2 litigation presented in the aftermath of Shelby County.187

180 Id. In his study, Stephanopoulos determined that Section 2 suits since 1982
had a fifty percent success rate, ten percentage points higher than the win rate of all
Section 2 suits filed since the VRA’s enactment. Id.
181 Tomas Lopez, ‘Shelby County’: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 24, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later
[https://perma.cc/82T2-HQ7G].
182 Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The New Vote Denial
Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J. F. 799, 800 (2018); New Voting
Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR J UST. (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/New%20Voting%20Restrictions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QEQ-FFX6]. By 2018, “24 states have put in place new restrictions
since [the 2010 election].” New Voting Restrictions in America, supra note 182.
183 Lopez, supra note 181.
184 Texas NAACP v. Steen (consolidated with Veasey v. Abbott), BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/naacp-v-steen
[https://perma.cc/RQ8T-3J76].
185 League of Women Voters of North Carolina, Et Al. v. North Carolina, ACLU
(May 15, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/cases/league-women-voters-north-carolina-et-al-vnorth-carolina [https://perma.cc/C7YM-CGHQ].
186 See supra notes 184–185; Naila Awan, Voting Rights Challenges in the Wake
of Shelby County, DEMOS: POLICYSHOP (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.demos.org/blog/2/4/16/
voting-rights-challenges-wake-shelby-county [https://perma.cc/BY72-99FB].
187 NAACP LDF, supra note 12 (explaining that Section 2 litigation requires
more time and money than Section 5 litigation and places the burden of proof on the
plaintiff rather than the defending jurisdiction).
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Section 2 litigation presented stark contrasts to Section
5 litigation.188 Section 2 proved to be far more resource-intensive
by placing the burden of proof primarily on plaintiffs, requiring
knowledge few lawyers possessed, requiring resources beyond
the capacities of most impact-litigation organizations, and
demanding the voluminous production of documents as well as
expert witnesses.189 Section 2 litigation could also cost up to
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, much of which
were paid by public funds.190 Section 2 litigation also lasted, on
average, “between two to five years.”191 One or more national
elections could therefore occur with potentially discriminatory
voting laws in place. Along with the inability to block potentially
discriminatory legislation, the costs borne by Section 2
litigation, the loss of transparency, the loss of the coverage
formula, and voter registration challenges produced a decrease
in voter registration numbers.192
North Carolina presented a particularly egregious
example of how the loss of the coverage formula worked in
tandem with a failure to comply with the National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA).193 Through the NVRA, states are
required to offer voter registration at public assistance agencies
and motor vehicle offices.194 Due to its noncompliance with the
NVRA, North Carolina experienced a “shocking decrease” in
submitted voter registration applications.195 Congress attempted
to address the needs of voters with the VRAA of 2015, but the
bill ultimately failed to pass.196
Id.
Id. at 2.
190 Id. at 3.
191 Id. at 4–5.
192 Awan, supra note 186.
193 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); Awan, supra note 186.
194 52 U.S.C. §§ 20503–20504 (2012 & Supp. II 2015) (requiring states to
establish procedures for voter registration for federal elections, in part, by offering
registration applications simultaneously with an application for a driver’s license); id.
§ 20506 (requiring states to designate agencies, such as offices providing public
assistance, as voter registration agencies); Awan, supra note 186.
195 Awan, supra note 186.
196 H.R. 885, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2867, 114th Cong. (2015). The Voting
Rights Amendment Act of 2015 would have placed a State under the preclearance regime
if the State had “[five] or more voting rights violations occur[ ] in the State during the
previous [fifteen] calendar years, at least one of which was committed by the State itself.”
H.R. 885. § 3(b)(1)(A). A political subdivision would have been placed under the
preclearance regime if it had “[three] or more voting rights violations occur[ ] in the
subdivision during the previous [fifteen] calendar years; or [one] or more voting rights
violations occur[ ] in the subdivision during the previous [fifteen] calendar years and the
subdivision had persistent, extremely low minority turnout during the previous [fifteen]
calendar years.” H.R. 885, § 3(1)(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). The Voting Rights Advancement Act of
2015, on the other hand, would have placed a State under the preclearance regime if the
188
189

2018]

IV.

A NEW VOTING RIGHTS ACT

245

VOTING RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2017

The VRAA of 2015 attempted to update the coverage
formula, continue protections for language minorities, include
protections for voters with disabilities, and increase
transparency.197 Under a new coverage formula, the VRAA of
2015 would have covered Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona,
California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.198 Further,
the VRAA of 2015 would have lifted coverage of any jurisdiction
that had not violated the law within ten years.199 The VRAA of
2015 also required jurisdictions to publicly post all changes to
their voting laws that occurred within 180 days of an election.200
The proposed act empowered the Attorney General to send
federal observers to polls during early voting and Election Day
to monitor any possible racial discrimination.201 Additionally, the
VRAA of 2015 provided protections for Native Americans and
Alaska Natives by increasing language access and access to
registration and polls “on and off of Indian reservations.”202 The
bill, however, “died” in Congress.203 Congress moved again in
2017 to restore the VRA.

State had “[fifteen] or more voting rights violations occur[ ] in the State during the
previous [twenty-five] calendar years; or [ten] or more voting rights violations occur[ ] in
the State during the previous [twenty-five] calendar years, at least one of which was
committed by the State itself.” Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 2867
§ 4(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). A political subdivision would have been placed under the preclearance
regime if it had “[three] or more voting rights violations occur[ ] in the subdivision during
the previous [twenty-five] calendar years.” H.R. 2867 § 4(b)(1)(B). The Voting Rights
Advancement Act of 2015 also included provisions to protect voting on Indian Lands.
H.R. 2867 § 2; see also Jim Sensenbrenner, Without a Modernized Voting Rights Act,
There’s No Such Thing as an Honest Election, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/without-a-modernized-voting-rights-act-there
s-no-such-thing-as-an-honest-election/2016/11/02/ba1cb138-a06b-11e6-8832-23a007c77b
b4_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4e36495b201 [https://perma.cc/J4LS-SBRY].
197 Fact Sheet: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, LAW. COMM. FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW 1 (June 24, 2015) [hereinafter LAW. COMM .], http://lawyers
committee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/VRAA-Fact-Sheet-2015.pdf [https://perma
.cc/79VC-MY8A]; Voting Rights Act for Today: Moving Voting Rights Forward,
LEADERSHIP CONF. 1 (July 17, 2015) [hereinafter L EADERSHIP CONF.], https://
www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/advancement_act_fact_sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KB36-HG6A].
198 See LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1.
199 See LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1; LEADERSHIP CONF. supra note 197, at 1.
200 See LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 2; LEADERSHIP CONF. supra note 197, at 1.
201 See LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1; LEADERSHIP CONF. supra note 197, at 2.
202 See LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1; LEADERSHIP CONF. supra note 197, at 2.
203 See Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015 (2015; 114th Congress H.R.
2867), GOVTRACK https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2867 [https://perma.cc/
9TWM-MDQW].
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Despite its earlier setbacks, Congress reintroduced the
VRAA in 2017.204 The bill, if it was enacted, would have put the
same thirteen states under the coverage formula as the proposed
VRAA of 2015205 and would have examined the actions of covered
states from the years 1990 to 2015.206 The bill would have also
increased judicial scrutiny of voter identification laws and laws
that “reduce multilingual voting materials.”207 House
Republicans, however, have not supported the bill.208 Congress
should therefore liberalize the bailout provisions through
another round of amendments to increase the chances of passing
the VRAA into law.209
To effectuate such a liberalization, Congress should follow
the lead of the 1982 amendments and “recognize and reward”
good conduct.210 The exemptions to the NVRA provide such an
example. Along with requiring states to designate public offices
as places that offer voter registration, the NVRA also
“required . . . state[s] to accept and use . . . mail voter registration
application form[s].”211 Six states, however, were able to gain
exemptions from the NVRA’s requirements due to their voter
registration practices.212 North Dakota received an exemption as
it did not have voter registration requirements.213 Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming qualified for the exemption for having
registration available at polling places statewide during Election
Day, and New Hampshire and Idaho were exempted for adding
Election Day registration after the NVRA’s original date but
before the NVRA was amended to take effect in 1993.214

H.R. 2978, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1419, 115th Cong. (2017).
See Johnson, supra note 16; LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1.
206 See Johnson, supra note 16; LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1.
207 See Johnson, supra note 16; LAW. COMM. supra note 197, at 1.
208 Johnson, supra note 16.
209 Democrats won a majority of House seats in the 2018 midterm elections.
Molly Ball, Democrats Win the House, But Fall Short of Decisive Rebuke of Trump, TIME
(Nov. 7, 2018), http://time.com/5447422/midterm-elections-2018-democrats/ [https://
perma.cc/8YE2-RYL7]. Though House Democrats could pass the VRAA without House
Republican support, Democrats can obtain a more stable base to uphold the bill if they
gain Republican support through amending the bailout provisions.
210 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(1982) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); Hebert, supra
note 18, at 262.
211 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77, 79
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20505(a)); ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40609, THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993: HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION,
AND EFFECTS 4–5 (2013).
212 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77, 78
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20503(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015)); CROCKER, supra
note 211, at 3.
213 CROCKER, supra note 211, at 3.
214 Id.
204
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Following the example of the NVRA, the amendments to
the bailout provision should affirmatively, rather than
punitively, encourage states under Section 5 coverage to achieve
parity in voting. As Chief Justice Roberts stated in Shelby
County, “[t]he [Fifteenth] Amendment is not designed to punish
for the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future.”215
Liberalized bailout provisions in combination with the VRAA’s
new coverage formula will ensure a better future for equitable
and affirmative voting procedures in the United States.
V.

BAILOUT PROVISION AMENDMENTS FOR THE VRAA OF
2017

In the VRAA of 2017, states and their political
subdivisions can be subjected to federal oversight for ten years
if they have either (1) committed fifteen or more voting rights
violations during the past twenty-five years; or (2) committed
ten or more voting rights violations during the past twenty-five
years and at least one of those violations was committed by the
state itself.216 In the previous VRA, a state could request a
bailout from Section 5 of the VRA if it could prove that it had no
longer engaged in voting discrimination for at least ten years.217
If its bailout request was approved, the state would receive a
declaratory judgment from the D.C. Circuit Court.218 One of the
factors considered by the court is whether a state “engaged in
constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment of
persons exercising rights” to vote regardless of race or color.219
The court also considered whether a state “engaged in other
constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for
convenient registration and voting for every person of voting age
and the appointment of minority persons as election officials
throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the election and
registration process.”220 Even after receiving a favorable
declaratory judgment, the state would remain under the court’s
supervision for ten years and could be recalled under Section 5
if the state subsequently engaged in voter discrimination.221
Southern representatives have complained that such bailout

Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013).
H.R. 2978, 15th Cong. § 4(b)(1)(A) (2017).
217 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
218 Id.
219 Id. § 10303(a)(1)(F)(ii).
220 Id. § 10303(a)(1)(F)(iii).
221 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(5) (2012 & Supp. II 2015); Introduction to Federal Voting
Rights Laws: Before the Voting Rights Act, supra note 19; COLEMAN, supra note 21, at 18.
215
216

248

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

standards are impossible to achieve.222 Congressional supporters
of the VRAA must amend the bailout provisions in order to gain
the bipartisan support necessary to pass the VRAA.
Southern members of Congress as well as members from
newly covered states such as Florida would likely be quite
hostile to such a bailout provision.223 To assuage concerns that
the bailout provision may be too onerous for covered
jurisdictions, supporters of the VRAA should propose
amendments for the bailout based on the Butler amendments
that were offered, though ultimately rejected in 1975,224 and on
the original bailout provisions. Representative M. Caldwell
Butler of Virginia proposed amending the bailout provisions in
the following ways: a jurisdiction would be permitted
to escape coverage . . . if: (1) sixty percent of minority citizens were
registered and had voted “in the most recent general election for
President or Members of Congress”; (2) no objections had been made
under section 5 during the two years preceding the action; (3) during
the previous five years the jurisdiction had not had a final judgment
issued against it for violating the voting rights of minorities, had not
used a “test or device,” and had made all required submissions; and
(4) “an affirmative legislative program” had been undertaken to
eliminate legal and procedural barriers to full and effective minority
political participation.225

Members of Congress and the Supreme Court would likely be
receptive to an “affirmative legislative program” to make the
bailout provisions affirmative rather than punitive. According to
Representative Butler’s proposal, an “affirmative legislative
program” needed to offer:
(a) citizens eligible to vote an opportunity to register during evenings
on a reasonable number of days each month and on a reasonable
number of Saturdays and Sundays of each month; (b) reasonable public
notice of the opportunity to register; (c) a place of registration and a
place for voting at a location with access to and not an unreasonable
distance from the place of residence of every eligible citizen of voting
age residing within such State or political subdivisions; (d) reasonable
provision for minority representation among election officials at polling
places where minorities are registered to vote; (e) apportionment plans
222 Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act: The Need for a Revised Bailout System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 27
(2010) (quoting Rep. M. Caldwell Butler saying that the 1982 bailout amendment made
“a mockery of the idea of reasonable bailout by crafting legislation which would establish
requirements impossible to achieve” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 64 (1981)).
223 Corey Dade, Is The Voting Rights Act Outdated, NPR (Dec. 1, 2012, 10:19
PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2012/12/01/166226641/is-the-voting-rights-act-outdated
[https://perma.cc/MW8W-QPJU].
224 See 121 CONG. REC. 16,764–65 (1975) (statement by Rep. Butler); O’Rourke,
supra note 74, at 780–81.
225 O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 780.
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which assure equal voter representation; (f) apportionment plans which
avoid submergence of cognizable racial or minority groups; (g) removal
of all unreasonable financial or other barriers to candidacy; and (h)
adequate opportunity for minority representation in all local governing
bodies where eligible minority citizens of voting age exceed twenty five
per centum of the eligible citizens of voting age residing within such
political subdivisions.226

Though the second section of Representative Butler’s
amendment would have allowed jurisdictions to apply for a
bailout if they had not received any Section 5 objections in the
two years preceding the bailout petition, the 1965 bailout
provisions required a showing of five years,227 a far less stringent
requirement than the 1982 bailout provisions.228 Therefore, the
bailout provisions for the VRAA could have a five-year baseline
for both receiving Section 5 objections as well as for using any
discriminatory tests or devices. Using the Butler amendments
and the 1965 bailout provisions as bases for new amendments,
Congress could enact new bailout provisions which would help
usher the VRAA into law.
In continuing with the trend of recent enactments and
Supreme Court opinions, Congress should propose amended
bailout provisions for the VRAA which would reward states that
not only stop passing discriminatory voting laws but also take
“constructive efforts” to end voter intimidation and harassment
and expand registration and voting by implementing “affirmative
legislative programs.”229 Congress could draft the amendments as
follows: a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 may apply for a
declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia to be released from preclearance requirements if it
can show that (1) the registration and voting rates of minority and
non-minority voters have a gap of no more than five percentage
points (e.g., 65 percent minority registration to 70 percent nonminority registration); (2) no objections have been made in the
five years preceding the application; (3) during the previous five
years the jurisdiction had not had a final judgment issued against
226 Id. at 780 n.80 (citing 121 CONG. REC. 16,764–65 (1975) (amendment to H.R.
6219, offered by Rep. Butler)).
227 121 CONG. REC. 16,764 (1975) (statement by Rep. Butler) (allowing covered
jurisdictions to apply for declaratory judgment in Section (2)(A) of the amendment if in the
two years before filing for such judgment the Attorney General made no objections and the
District Court for the District of Columbia made no denials of a declaratory judgment
request); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965).
228 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 2, § 4(a), 96
Stat. 131, 131; Hebert, supra note 18, at 261 (explaining that the 1982 “bailout standard”
was extended from seventeen years to nineteen years).
229 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (a)(1)(F)(ii)–(iii) (2012 & Supp. II 2015); O’Rourke, supra
note 74, at 780.
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it for violating the voting rights of minorities, had not used a test
or device, and had made all required submissions; (4) the
jurisdiction has not been assigned any federal examiners or
observers within the preceding five years; and (5) an affirmative
legislative program had been undertaken to eliminate legal and
procedural barriers to full and effective minority political
participation.230 Further, the affirmative legislative program
must be submitted in writing to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia to be determined whether it will indeed
increase minority civic participation.
A jurisdiction should be allowed to submit a combination
of any of the following as part of its affirmative program;
additionally, the list should not be exhaustive as to further
encourage innovation and experimentation among the states: (1)
opportunities for eligible citizens to register to vote on evenings
and weekends; (2) opportunities for eligible citizens to vote
outside of Election Day; (3) reasonable public notice of the
opportunity to register; (4) a place to register and a place to vote
accessible to every eligible citizen from their place of residence;
(5) reasonable provision for minority representation among
election officials at polling places where minorities are
registered to vote; (6) apportionment plans which assure equal
voter representation; (7) apportionment plans which avoid the
submergence of cognizable racial or minority groups; (8) removal
of all financial or other barriers to candidacy; and (9) adequate
opportunity for minority representation in all local governing
bodies where minorities exceed 25 percent of citizens eligible to
vote.231 Using these amended bailout provisions, Congress is
more likely to pass the VRAA as the provisions are partially
based on amendments previously offered by a southern
Republican who saw the preclearance regime as a stigma upon
southern states.232 The amended provisions will also allow states
to create their own affirmative solutions to voter discrimination
and disparities and aid individual members as well as their
political party in successfully competing for new voters.
A.

The Amended Bailout Provisions Would Gain
Congressional Republican Support for the VRAA

Republicans, especially those from states covered by the
preclearance regime, have viewed Section 5 as putting a “scarlet
230
231
232

See 121 CONG. REC. 16,764–65 (1975) (statement by Rep. Butler).
Id.
Id.
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letter” on southern states.233 They have also viewed the bailout
provisions as being impossible to attain.234 Congressional
Republicans would thus be highly skeptical of a VRAA in which
not only the updated coverage formula but also the amended
bailout provisions were written primarily, if not solely, by
Democrats and even more by Democrats from northern and
western states.
Congressional Republicans would, on the other hand, be
much more likely to support bailout provisions based largely on
the Butler amendments proposed in 1975 for the following
reasons. First, under these proposed amendments, states will
gain the ability to innovate and experiment with their election
laws to fully include the political participation of minority
voters. Judges, politicians, and academics have leveled critiques
at the federal government for “commandeering” states to adopt
policies favored by the federal government.235 The amended
bailout provisions avoid such a critique by offering a list of
possible policy solutions to racial disparities in voting by
allowing the states to choose which policies would work best for
them or to implement policies not included on the list. By
adopting such an approach, Congress would allow states to,
quite literally, operate as “laboratories of democracy.”236 Though
supporters of robust enforcement of federal voting laws may
voice concerns about a more decentralized approach allowing
some states to lag behind and repeat the “all deliberate speed”
pace of reforms as was seen during school desegregation,237
233 Adam Clark Estes, What’s at Stake in the Voting Rights Battle, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/whats-stakevoting-rights-act-battle/317940/ [https://perma.cc/EHF2-KXQY]; Jeffrey Toobin, Voter,
Beware, NEW YORKER (Mar. 2, 2009), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/02/
voter-beware [https://perma.cc/D72H-R22Q] (quoting Rep. Lynn Westmoreland of
Georgia as saying, “Congress is declaring from on high that states with voting problems
forty years ago can simply never be forgiven—that Georgians must eternally wear the
scarlet letter because of the actions of their grandparents and great-grandparents.”).
234 See Seaman, supra note 222, at 20.
235 See Simon Lazarus, The Temptations of the Court, SLATE (Mar. 27, 2012,
11:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/03/
republican_governors_claim_obamacare_is_a_violation_of_states_rights_.html [https://
perma.cc/T46C-H28S]; Ilya Somin, Federalism, the Constitution, and Sanctuary Cities,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/11/26/federalism-the-constitution-and-sanctuary-cities
/?utm_term=.e5d5026442c6 [https://perma.cc/M6ZY-ML66].
236 See Edmund Andrews, Steven Callander: How to Make States “Laboratories of
Democracy”, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (May 19, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/
insights/steven-callander-how-make-states-laboratories-democracy [https://perma.cc/
JA8B-UE7H].
237 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); Pedro Noguera & Robert
Cohen, The Legacy of ‘All Deliberate Speed’, EDUC. WK. (May 19, 2004),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/05/19/37noguera.h23.html [https://perma.cc/
87QP-CVNM].

252

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

congressional supporters of the VRAA could emphasize that
when put together with the new coverage formula, the bailout
amendments would encourage states to promote the full political
participation of minorities while complying with federal laws
through the preclearance regime. Minority voters will have
amassed enough organized political power through the
affirmative efforts of the state to hold states accountable once
the state has been bailed out of Section 5. Members of Congress
will also be more accountable to their constituents through the
amended bailout provisions.
Second, through their use of affirmative measures to
politically empower minority voters, representatives and
senators seen as supporting such policies will be able to use their
record to gain the votes of newly registered voters. Supporters of
the VRAA would then be able to counteract the current set of
incentives used to dilute the power of minority voters. At
present, politicians can enact discriminatory redistricting
measures to guarantee their seat in Congress.238 Under a regime
of the VRAA’s coverage formula and the proposed bailout
provision amendments, members of Congress will instead be
encouraged to promote fair apportionments of voters in districts
to gain a bailout. With a bailout on record, a member of Congress
can then tout both the bailout and the increased political
participation as reasons for voters to support the member of
Congress. Moreover, if able to gain passage, supporters of the
VRAA could rest assured that the VRAA would survive judicial
scrutiny from the Roberts Court. The amended bailout
provisions would address the Court’s concern about states
retaining sovereignty and equal treatment from the federal
government through less stringent and more contemporary
bailout criteria along with a state-based affirmative program.
B.

The Amended Bailout Provisions Would Pass Judicial
Scrutiny

The VRAA addresses the Supreme Court’s concern of
punishing states based on outdated data, so the amended bailout
provisions must assuage the Court’s worry about maintaining the
238 LAUREN BOYDEN & MICHAEL LI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUS., EXTREME MAPS 3
(2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20
Maps%205.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL8W-CR3R]; Christopher Ingraham, This Is the
Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You Will Ever See, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Mar.
1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-bestexplanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3c6c65d2e3e2
[https://perma.cc/EQM9-TBX2].
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equal sovereignty of states. The VRAA with the amended bailout
provisions would survive the Court’s analysis for three reasons.
First, the new coverage formula itself only brings states with
recent records of discrimination in voting under the preclearance
regime.239 Second, states under the preclearance regime would
undergo an identical process to obtain a bailout. Congress would
establish such an identical process by maintaining the
requirement for covered states to petition the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment as opposed
to petitioning their local district courts.
Each state seeking a bailout must go before the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia to receive a declaratory
judgment240 and would thus receive a similar analysis from threejudge panels that may contain some of the same judges. Southern
states have initially viewed being assigned to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia as disadvantageous as the
judges were viewed as more “cosmopolitan” by Congress.241 States
would, however, likely have complaints about unequal treatment
if they instead appealed to district courts within their own
jurisdiction. Though states may believe that remaining in their
jurisdiction with judges likely hailing from their state would
provide a sort of home field advantage, decisions from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit show that states
are not more likely to win their case just by appealing to an instate or regional court.242 Indeed, an in-state or regional federal
court may even write an opinion with phrases easily quoted by
national media outlets leading to further stigmatization of the
state.243 States may then contend that the federal courts in their
H.R. 2978, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1419, 115th Cong. (2017).
Hebert, supra note 18, at 259.
241 Crum, supra note 121, at 2008–09.
242 See Anne Blythe, 4th U.S. Circuit Judges Overturn North Carolina’s Voter
ID Law, NEWS & OBSERVER (July 30, 2016, 6:12 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/
news/politics-government/state-politics/article92593512.html [https://perma.cc/9FTBMFW8]; see also Vann R. Newkirk II, Texas Keeps Failing to Convince Federal Courts Its
Voting Laws Aren’t Racist, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/04/texas-loses-another-voting-rights-case/523905/ [https://perma.
cc/LL77-SSFB] (noting how Texas lost its initial defense of its voting identification law
in a Texas federal district court).
243 See Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Appeals Court Strikes Down North
Carolina’s Voter-ID Law, WASH. POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/appeals-court-strikes-down-north-carolinas-voter-id-law/2016/07/29/
810b5844-4f72-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html?utm_term=.c9aa8391c809 [https://
perma.cc/SC75-835Z] (quoting the Fourth Circuit court’s opinion where it stated that
North Carolina “target[ed] African Americans with . . . surgical precision.”); Camila
Domonoske, U.S. Appeals Court Strikes Down North Carolina’s Voter ID Law, NPR (July
29, 2016, 2:04 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/29/487935700/
u-s-appeals-court-strikes-down-north-carolinas-voter-id-law [https://perma.cc/M55UPXXU]; (same); Michael Wines & Alan Blinder, Federal Appeals Court Strikes Down
239
240
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jurisdiction are applying a more stringent standard than federal
courts in other jurisdictions that have granted more bailout
requests. States can charge no such claim when each state must
approach the same court for a bailout.
Further, to remain in compliance with Northwest Austin,
Congress must now allow counties, cities, and townships to apply
for bailouts independent of the state.244 Covered states with large
cities, such as Nashville, Charlotte, and Atlanta, known for more
liberal politics and larger minority populations, have clashed with
those cities regarding legislative agendas.245 States may then
accuse local district courts of favoritism if it seems cities are
obtaining bailouts at a higher rate than states. Such complaints
of favoritism would be multiplied when judging courts in other
states as well. States, cities, and townships would thus all greatly
benefit from petitioning only the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia for bailout requests despite the
inconvenience of litigating their case outside of their state. Critics
of maintaining federal oversight through district courts or the
DOJ have also proposed the possibility of using independent
agencies to enforce federal voting laws.246
An independent agency available to review applications to
be bailed out of the preclearance regime would also pass the test
of providing an identical process to each jurisdiction that would
come before it. Agencies, however, may actually lessen the
chances of passage for the VRAA. The objective and disinterested
nature of independent agencies is constantly in question.247
Members of Congress hesitant to support the VRAA may be
dissuaded by the possibility of going before an agency vulnerable
to “regulatory capture.”248 District court judges, on the other hand,
North Carolina Voter ID Requirement, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/07/30/us/federal-appeals-court-strikes-down-north-carolina-voterid-provision.html?mtrref=www.google.com [https://perma.cc/D6KB-T3QJ] (same).
244 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009).
245 See K.W., How Conservative States and Liberal Cities Vie for Control,
ECONOMIST (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/
10/economist-explains-0 [https://perma.cc/BT3C-288C].
246 Brittany C. Armour, Note, After Shelby County v. Holder, Can Independent
Commissions Take the Place of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?, 53 WASH. U. J. L. &
POL’Y 269, 288–90 (2017) (proposing the use of independent commissions in vote denial
cases as some states have used independent redistricting commissions in
gerrymandering and vote dilution cases); Foley, supra note 169, at 343–44 (proposing
the use of a Voting Rights Advisory Board that would review any change to voting rights
laws brought to it by local communities and label such laws as “retrogressive” or not,
though such labeling would not carry the force of law).
247 See e.g., Alan B. Morrison, How Independent Are Independent Regulatory
Agencies?, 37 DUKE L.J. 252, 252–53 (1988).
248 Will Baude, Regulatory and Academic Capture, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014/05/18/regulatory-and-academic-capture/?utm_term=.93c2e80d8051 [https://
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have not had their independence and objectivity questioned to
such a degree.249 As the sole court to oversee bailout applications,
the District Court for the District of Columbia has also developed
an expertise regarding such matters.250 A new agency would have
to begin building anew its knowledge base of both the process and
substance of adjudicating bailout proceedings. Thus, for both
procedural and substantive reasons, members of Congress will be
more likely to support the VRAA that maintains the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia as the judicial forum for bailout
proceedings rather than moving them to an independent agency.
Jurisdictions applying for bailout would also maintain equal
sovereignty as the bailout requirements would be much more
similar to the requirements at the time of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach than the requirements at the time of Shelby County.251
Third, the amended bailout provisions revert to
requirements like those upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.
By adopting the Butler amendments, however, Congress will
have made the bailout provisions more affirmative rather than
punitive. The Shelby County Court wrote that the Fifteenth
Amendment was intended to look towards the future rather than
to the past.252 With bailout provisions similar to those accepted by
the Katzenbach Court and measures to allow states to be
rewarded for increasing voter registration and civic participation,
perma.cc/YN29-MUQS]; Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Government’s Elite and
Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 11, 2010, 2:00 PM), https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture/ [https://
perma.cc/QL3C-2NCF] (describing how “social capture” and “ideological capture” operate
and cause regulators to rule in the interest of the industry they regulate rather than rule
in the public interest); James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INDUSTRY INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT
IT 71, 78–80 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014)
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Kwak%20-%20Cultural
%20Capture%20and%20the%20Financial%20Crisis.pdf https://perma.cc/XEW4-4KXS]
(explaining how “cultural capture,” through the mechanisms of group identification,
status, and relationship networks, cause regulators to work in favor of industry interests
over public interests).
249 See John Cassidy, In Praise of Independent Judges, from Learned Hand to
Richard J. Leon, NEW YORKER (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/johncassidy/in-praise-of-independent-judges-from-learned-hand-to-richard-j-leon
[https://perma.cc/VC4C-VD89]; Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, Resisting the Myth of
the Judicial Resistance, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2018, 4:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/01/the-judges-whove-ruled-against-trump-arent-part-of-some-judicialresistance.html [https://perma.cc/XP26-BJVY].
250 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Expertise and Opinion Assignment on the Courts
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1599, 1604 (2015).
251 Compare Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 539 (2012) (writing that the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 allowed states and political subdivisions to apply
for a bailout after ten years), with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331
(1966) (writing that Congress made the bailout provisions available to states and
political subdivisions that had not committed voter discrimination in five years).
252 Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 553.
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the bailout amendments will address the Court’s concern about
the VRA punishing certain states for past acts. The Court will also
likely look favorably upon the affirmative measures of the bailout
provisions as the states are able to choose independently whether
to adopt those measures, create their own measures not thought
of by Congress, or some combination of the two. With states
having the independence to choose their own affirmative
measures, the Roberts Court will likely see the amended bailout
provisions as increasing the amount of sovereignty states enjoy in
administering their voting laws as compared to the amount of
sovereignty states were granted by the preclearance regime
reviewed by the Court in Shelby County.
By creating a new coverage formula, providing the same
judicial forum for all jurisdictions applying for a bailout, reducing
the amount of time required to prove that discriminatory tests and
devices have ceased, and allowing states to choose their own
affirmative measures to encourage voter registration and civic
participation, the VRAA with amended bailout provisions will
satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement that the principle of equal
sovereignty among the states not be violated. And if the principle
has been violated, Congress had violated the principle in a manner
that rewards jurisdictions for future good acts rather than
punishing them for prior bad acts. The VRAA would then survive
judicial scrutiny by meeting the updated coverage formula and
equal sovereignty tests set by Shelby County v. Holder.
CONCLUSION
Americans have long regarded voting to be a core
component of citizenship. Though the Fifteenth Amendment
promised equal status and treatment as voters to all Americans,
Congress needed to pass the Voting Right Act one hundred years
after the amendment was passed to fulfill that promise. In fact,
the VRA fulfilled the promise so successfully that the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled one of its most innovative protections—the
coverage formula—as antiquated and unconstitutional. Despite
the Court’s ruling, states formerly covered by the VRA as well
as states not covered by the VRA subsequently passed restrictive
voting laws which disproportionately affected voters of color. A
new law protecting the voting rights of all Americans is needed
to fulfill the purpose of the VRA and strengthen the U.S.
electoral system.
Congress has already addressed the need for a
modernized coverage formula through the VRAA. Congress is
not likely to pass the bill, however, without amending the bill in
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ways to appeal to Republicans. Supporters of the VRAA can gain
those needed votes by liberalizing the bailout provisions of the
VRA. The amended bailout provisions will provide states with a
clear and affirmative path to leave the preclearance regime. In
the process, minority voters will regain the ability to hold their
jurisdictions accountable for discriminatory voting practices as
well as gain political power and organization through the
implementation of affirmative legislative programs. States and
their political subdivisions will thus be rewarded and emerge
from preclearance coverage as more “small-d” democratic
jurisdictions.253 More importantly, voters like Rosanell Eaton
will, once again, be rewarded for their political participation and
civic engagement.
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